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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Section 78-2a-3(2)(k), Utah Code Annotated (1992) and Rule 5
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court correctly denied Petitioner's
Motion to Change Venue to the First District Court?

The

applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion.

Olympia

Sales Company v. Long, 604 P.2d 919 (Utah 1979); Estate of
Thorley, 579 P.2d 927 (Utah 1978).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.
Addendum A.

U.C.A. S 78-6-1 (1992) is set out in full in
It provides in pertinent part as follows:

(1) The Circuit Court . . . may create a
department known as the
"Small Claims
Department" which has jurisdiction in cases:
(a) for the recovery of money where the amount
claimed does not exceed $2,000, including
attorney fees but exclusive of court costs and
interest and where the defendant resides or
the action of indebtedness was incurred within
the jurisdiction of the court in which the
action is to be maintained.
B,
Addendum B.

U.C.A. § 78-13-1 (1992) is set out in full in
It provides in pertinent part as follows:

Actions for the following causes must be tried
in the county in which the subject of the
action, or some part thereof, is situated . .
. (1) . . . for injuries to real property.

1

C.
Addendum C

U.C.A. § 78-13-4 (1992) is set out in full in
It provides in pertinent part as follows:

When the defendant has signed a contract in
the state to perform an obligationf an action
on the contract may be commenced in the
following venues:
(2) . . • in the
county where
such obligation
is to be
performed, the contract was signed, oT in
which the defendant resides.
D.
Addendum D.

U.C.A. S 78-13-7 (1992) is set out in full in
It provides in pertinent part as follows:

In all other cases, the action must be tried
in the county in which the cause of action
arises, or in the county in which the
defendant resides at the commencement of the
action.
E.

U.C.A. § 78-13-8 (1992) provides as follows:

If the county in which the action is
commenced is not the proper county for the
trial thereof, the action may nevertheless be
tried therein, unless the defendant at the
tiiae he answers or otherwise appears files a
motion, in writing, that the trial be had in
the proper county.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Petitioner R. M. Jensen, also known as Richard M.
Jensen ("Jensen") appeals from the Order Denying Defendant's
(Jensen) Motion to Change Venue to the First District Court,
signed by the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday of the Seventh Judicial
District Court, on September 9, 1992.
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On appeal, Jensen contends the trial court erred in
denying the motion to change venue.

To support this contention,

Jensen argues (1) as a matter of lawf venue should have been
changed to Box Elder County, which is in the First Judicial
District; and (2) venue should have been changed to the First
Judicial District in the interest of justice and convenience of
witnesses.
B.

Course of Proceedings

Respondent Moab Building Center, Inc., a Utah
corporation ("Moab Building Center") filed a Small Claims
Affidavit and Order (the "Small Claims Affidavit")in the Small
Claims Department ("Small Claims Department") of the Seventh
Judicial District Court, Grand County, Utah ("Seventh District
Court") on August 13, 1992. The Small Claims Affidavit alleged
that Jensen owed Moab Building Center $733.65 plus $20.00 filing
fee, for building materials (the "Materials") purchased from Moab
Building Center by Jensen.
By separate documents dated August 31, 1993 and filed
in the Seventh District Court, on September 14, 1993, Jensen:
1*

Counterclaimed for $11,275.00 in property and

punitive damages;
2.

Moved to transmit the case from the Small

Claims Department to the Seventh District Court; and
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3.

Moved to change venue from the Seventh

District Court to the First District Court, Box Elder County,
Utah ("First District Court").
C.

Disposition in the Court Below

On September 9, 1993, before the time expired for Moab
Building Center to file its objection to the motion to change
venue, Judge Halliday denied Jensen's Motion to Change Venue to
the First District Court.

The Order Denying Defendant's (Jensen)

Motion to Change Venue to the First District Court (Addendum E)
was signed by the Court on Wednesday, September 9, 1992, and
filed on Monday, September 14, 1992.

Jensen appealed the trial

court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court which poured the case
over to this court.
D.

Statement of Relevant Facts

Because this case originated as a small claims action,
there are no complaint, answer and counterclaim setting out the
allegations of the parties.

There has been no trial determining

which allegations are true.

The statement of facts in

appellant's brief is accordingly unsupported by any citations to
the record.

However, Moab Building Center accepts the Statement

of Facts as a statement of the facts as Jensen would allege them
if an answer and counterclaim were filed.

This is not to say

Moab Building Center accepts all of Jensen's statement of facts
as true.

Moab Building Center accepts some of those facts and
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disputes others.

The correct statement of admitted and disputed

facts follows:
1.

On May 18, 1992, Jensen contacted Moab

Building Center in Grand County, Utah and requested the delivery
of the Materials to a building site in Blanding, San Juan County,
Utah, where Jensen was building a home.
2.

Moab Building Center delivered the Materials

in Blanding, San Juan County, Utah, on May 21, 1992.
3.

Jensen claims that Moab Building Center

damaged the driveway where he was building a home when the
Materials were delivered.
4.

Moab Building Center disputes this.

Jensen claims Moab Building Center agreed to

pay for the damage to the driveway, and the damage was
&11,275.20.

Moab Building Center disputes this.
5.

Moab Building Center filed this action to

collect for the delivered Materials.
6.

Jensen filed his counteraffidavit (the

"Counterclaim") to recover for the alleged damage to the
driveway.
7.

In addition to the Motion for Change of Venue

to the First District Court (Record at 6-7) f Jensen filed the
following at the same time Jensen filed the motion for change of
venue:
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a.

The Counterclaim in the Small Claims

Department denying Jensen owed Moab Building Center $753.65 and
asserting a counterclaim for $11,275.00 in property and punitive
damages (Record at 3 ) ;
b.

A motion to transmit the dispute from the

Small Claims Department to the Seventh District Court.1
8.

The Counterclaim appears to be Jensen's

attempt to collect for the alleged damage to the driveway.
9.

On September 9, 1992, the Small Claims

Department granted the motion to transmit to the Seventh District
Court (Record at 2) and denied Jensen's Motion to Change Venue to
the First District Court (Record at 8-9).
10.

On February 3, 1993, Moab Building Center

filed a Motion for Leave to Amend and for Change of Venue.

The

motion for change of venue states Moab Building Center has no
objection to changing venue to San Juan County, Utah (Record at
68-73) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

VENUE IS PROPER IN GRAND COUNTY.
U.C.A. § 78-6-1 allows a small claims case to be filed

in a small claims department in the county where the actions
which gave rise to the indebtedness occurred.

All of the actions

*For some reason this motion is not part of the record.
Jensen included this motion as part of his brief as Exhibit "D"
and Moab Building Center includes it as ADDENDUM F.
6

which gave rise to the indebtedness, which is the subject of this
action, occurred in Grand County.

The Small Claims Department

was a proper forum for Moab Building Center to file the Small
Claims Affidavit and the denial of Jensen's motion to change
venue was correct.
II.

JENSEN WAIVED ANY RIGHT HE MAY HAVE HAD TO
CHANGE VENUE.
If Jensen had any right to change venue (Moab Building

Center contends Jensen had no right), Jensen waived the right.
Jensen was required to make a motion to change venue at his first
appearance and before making other motions.

Because Jensen made

other motions before making the motion to change venue, Jensen
waived any right he had to object to venue.
III.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, VENUE IS PROPER IN SAN
JUAN COUNTY.
The Counterclaim of Jensen asked for monetary relief in

excess of the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Department, thus
making a motion to transmit to the Seventh District Court
necessary.

If because the Counterclaim is what removed the

dispute to the district court we look at the Counterclaim for
proper venue, venue is proper in San Juan County and Grand
County.

The Counterclaim is for injury to real property located

in San Juan County and actions on injury to real property must be
tried where the real property is located.

Grand County could

retain venue because it had venue under the Small Claims

7

Affidavit.
IV.

THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND CONVENIENCE OF
WITNESSES DOES NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE OF VENUE.
Jensen argues venue should be changed for the interest

of justice and convenience of witnesses.

This argument was not

presented to the trial court and should not be considered by this
court.

In addition, Jensen does not tell the court why his view

of interest of justice and convenience is better than the current
circumstances.
V.

JENSEN CITES AUTHORITY WHICH DOES NOT SUPPORT
HIS PROPOSITIONS AND ARGUES IRRELEVANT MATERIAL.
For many of Jensen's arguments, he cites case law which

does not support his contentions or are not controlling law.

In

additionf most of Jensen's arguments state and argue material
which are irrelevant to this disposition of this matter.
ARGUMENT
I.

VENUE IS PROPER IN GRAND COUNTY.
I.A. Under U.C.A. § 78-6-1, venue is proper in
Grand County.
The venue statutes for a court of general jurisdiction

are found in U.C.A. § 78-13-1 et seq. (the "General Venue
Statutes").
jurisdiction.
(1992).

District courts in the state of Utah have statewide
Utah Const. Art. VIII f § 5; U.C.A. § 78-3-4(1)

The General Venue Statutes, however, may require a

district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction where venue
lies elsewhere.
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In contrast to the district courtr the jurisdiction of
a small claims department and its venue are coterminous.

The

jurisdiction statute of the small claims department is found in
U.C.A. §78-6-1 (the "Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute"), which
states:

"[T]he Small Claims Department . . . has jurisdiction in

cases: (a) for the recovery of money where the amount claimed
does not exceed $2f000 . . . and where the defendant resides or
the action of indebtedness was incurred within the jurisdiction
of the court . . . ."

U.C.A. §78-6-1 (1992) (emphasis added).

A

small claims department has jurisdiction only over those matters
specified in the Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute.
The General Venue Statutes are inapplicable in a small
claims department and the Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute
supercedes the General Venue Statutes in a small claims case.
Otherwise there is no need for the Small Claims Jurisdiction
Statute and the portion of U.C.A. § 78-6-1 which states: "[W]here
the defendant resides or the action of indebtedness was incurred
within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is to be
maintained" is duplicative of the General Venue Statutes and does
not make any sense.
In this case, Jensen contacted Moab Building Center at
Moab Building Center's sole place of business in Grand County and
ordered the Materials.

Grand County is the location in which the

Moab Building Center agreed to sell, and from which it shipped,
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the Materials.

Since the value of the Materials is less than

$2,000.00, the Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute is the statute
which governed the filing of the Small Claims Affidavit.

Since

the actions giving rise to the indebtedness occurred in Grand
County, Moab Building Center chose the proper venue and Jensen's
motion for change of venue was properly denied by the trial
court.
Jensen asks this Court to decide that because he was in
Brigham City at the time he made the telephone call for the
Materials, the actions giving rise to the indebtedness occurred
in Box Elder County.

The placing of the phone call was the only

action which occurred in Box Elder County.

However, the placing

of a phone call does not give rise to indebtedness.

It was not

until acts were performed by Moab Building Center, none of which
occurred in Box Elder County, any indebtedness arose.

The offer

of Jensen was accepted, and the contract formed, in Grand County.
I.B. Under the General Venue Statutes, venue is
proper in Grand County.
Even if the Court decides the Small Claims Jurisdiction
Statute does not supercede the General Venue Statutes, and that
somehow the Small Claims Jurisdiction Statute and the General
Venue Statutes must be read together, venue is proper in Grand
County.

The proper venue statute is found in U.C.A. § 78-13-7

which states:

"In all other cases the action must be tried in

the county in which the cause of action arises, or in the county
10

in which the defendant resides at the commencement of the action
• . . ."

U.C.A. § 78-13-7 (1992).
Under the General Venue Statutes this case could be

tried in either Grand County, where the cause of action arose2 or
in Box Elder County where the defendant resides.

Since Moab

Building Center chose a county of proper venue, the court was
correct in denying Jensen's motion for change of venue, even
though the motion asked the court to change venue to another
proper county.

Hale v. Barker, 259 P.2d 928 (Utah 1927).

At this point, Moab Building Center points out the case
of Olvmpia Sales Co. v. Long, 604 P.2d 919 (Utah 1979) which
Jensen cites in his brief.

In Olympia, the court stated, "It is

therefore the conclusion of this court that actions upon contract
not in writing, upon proper and timely demand being made, must be
tried in the county where one of the defendants resides at the
commencement of the action".

Ici. at 921.

Olvmpia interprets the

predecessor of U.C.A. § 78-13-43 as it was written prior to its
amendment in 1990.

2

Under the prior statute the court seemed to

See argument set forth in I.A above.

3

Prior to 1990, U.C.A. § 78-13-4 stated:
When the defendant has contracted in writing
to perform an obligation in a particular
county of the state and resides in another
county, an action on such contract,
obligation may be commenced and tried in the
county where such obligation is to be
performed or in which the defendant resides.
11

say an action of any contract, written or oral, other than when
the defendant has contracted in writing to perform an obligation
in particular place,4 venue is only proper in the county in which
the defendant resides.

In other words, unless the contract

specifies in writing a place of performance, venue is only proper
in the county in which the defendant resides.
Moab Building Center contends that Olympia is not
controlling law on this point because it interprets a prior law.
Since the decision in Olympia, the legislature has amended and
clarified U.C.A. § 78-13-4.

The statute, as amended in 1990, is

quite different than its predecessor which Olympia interpreted.
It is clear that U.C.A. § 78-13-4, as it now reads,5 applies only
to a contract signed in the State of Utah to perform an
obligation.

Thus the clear meaning of the statute is that the

applicability of Section 78-13-4 is limited to contracts signed
in the State of Utah.

If a contract was signed in the State of

Utah, then Section 78-13-4 operates to determine where venue is
proper.

In this case there is no contract which was signed in

the state, therefore, Section 78-13-4 is not applicable and any
case interpreting section 78-13-4 or it predecessors is not
controlling law.

4

Moab Building Center believes this to mean the place of
performance is specifically designated in writing in the
contract.
5

See Addendum C for full text.
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II,

JENSEN WAIVED ANY RIGHT HE MAY HAVE HAD TO CHANGE
VENUE.
Even if venue under the Small Claims Affidavit is not

in Grand County, Jensen waived any right to change venue.
U.R.C.P. 12(b) requires that a motion for improper venue "shall
be made before pleading if further pleading is permitted."
U.R.C.P. 12(b) (1992) (emphasis added).

In Rudd v. Crown

International, 488 P.2d 298 (Utah 1971) the Court said, "Section
78-13-8 . . . requires a defendant to file a motion for change of
venue at his first appearance.

Making any other motion or

appearance prior thereto usually forecloses defendant from
thereafter objecting to venue."
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d

.Id. at 301 (emphasis added);

1034, 1042 (Utah 1991).

By reading

U.C.A. § 78-13-8, U.R.C.P. 12(b), Rudd and Johnson together (and
the only way in which the statutes, rules of procedure, and case
law harmonize), it is clear a motion for change of venue must be
filed before any other motion or pleading.
In this case, Jensen's motion for change of venue was
not filed before his other motions or pleadings.

Jensen's motion

for change of venue asked the Seventh District Court to change
venue to the First District Court.

In order for the Seventh

District Court to rule on Jensen's Motion for Change of Venue,
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the Counterclaim6 and the Motion to Transmit to District Court
had to have been filed first.

Jensen's motion to transmit asked

the Small Claims Department to transmit to the Seventh District
Court.

Neither the Counterclaim nor the motion to transmit made

a motion for change of venue.

Therefore, Jensen did not file his

motion to change venue in a timely and proper manner as required
by U.C.A. § 78-13-8, U.R.C.P. 12, Rudd and Johnson, and therefore
waived any right Jensen may have had to change venue.
The proper procedure under U.C.A. § 78-13-8, U.R.C.P.
12 (b) and Rudd, in order not to waive any right to change venue,
would have been for Jensen to file a motion to change venue in
the Small Claims Department and obtain a ruling on the same prior
to filing the Counterclaim and the Motion to Transmit to the
District Court.

This is clearly the proper procedure

contemplated by U.R.C.P. 12(a) when it states?
The service of a motion under this rule alters
these periods of time7 as follows, unless a
different time is fixed by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion8 . . . the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action.
U.R.C.P. 12(b)(1992).
6

Which monetary claim exceeded the jurisdiction of the Small
Claims Department, thus making the Motion to Transmit to District
Court necessary.
7

Time periods for filing answers, cross-claims,
counterclaims, etc.
8

A motion for a change of venue (improper venue) is one of
the many motions to which this term applies. See U.R.C.P. 12 (b)
(1993) .
14

The denial of Jensen's motion for change of venue was
proper because Jensen, by his own actions, waived any right to
change venue.
III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, VENUE IS PROPER IN SAN JUAN COUNTY.
Under the Small Claims Affidavit, if the action of
indebtedness was not incurred in Grand County (where the
Materials were ordered and shipped) it most certainly was
incurred in San Juan County where the Materials were delivered,
the Invoice was presented and accepted, and the Check delivered.
Under no circumstances did the actions which gave rise to the
indebtedness occur in Box Elder County.
The Counterclaim is separate and distinct from the
Small Claims Affidavit and is essentially an independent cause of
action.

Although both might be viewed as arising out of the same

set of facts when viewed as a whole, the evidence to support each
claim is separate and distinct.

The Small Claims Affidavit is

under a contract and Jensen's failure to perform his obligation
thereunder.

On the other hand, the Counterclaim appears to be a

claim for injury to real property, a tort.

Evidence which

supports or negates the claims of Moab Building Center for
payment have little or no relevancy to the claims of Jensen for
injury to real property.
The filing of the Counterclaim and the granting of the
motion to transmit to the Seventh District Court removed the
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dispute from the Small Claims Department to the Seventh District
Court,

If, because the Counterclaim is the act which removed the

dispute to the Seventh District Court, we therefore look at where
venue is proper under the Counterclaim, then U.C.A. §78-13-1 is
the governing venue statute for injuries to real property.
U.C.A. §78-13-1 states:

"Actions for the following causes must

be tried in the county in which the subject of the action or some
part thereof is situated . . . (1) . . . injuries to real
property."

U.C.A. §78-13-1 (1992).

Under this statute the

proper place for venue, if determined by looking at the
Counterclaim, is in the place where the "subject of the action"
(the real property) is, which is San Juan County.

Therefore,

Jensen's motion for change of venue was properly denied because
venue is not in Box Elder County but rather under the
Counterclaim venue is only proper in San Juan County.

Under this

scenario Grand County would retain venue for the Counterclaim
because venue was proper in Grand County with regards to the
Small Claims Affidavit.
IV.

THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND CONVENIENCE OF WITNESSES
DOES NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE OF VENUE.
The second part of Jensen's argument is his motion for

change of venue should have been granted in the interest of
justice and convenience.

This argument was not presented to the

trial court by Jensen as a reason to change venue (See Record at
6-7).

It is well settled law that issues cannot be raised on
16

appeal for the first time.

Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of

Educ., 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990); Travner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856
(Utah 1984); Olson v. Park - Craig - Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356
(Utah App. 1991); Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d
1350 (Utah App. 1990).

Therefore, this argument of Jensen's

should not be considered by this Court.
However, if this Court should decide to consider this
argument, this argument is unpersuasive.

Jensen arguesf in point

4, that the "interest of justice would not be served by forcing
[Jensen] to travel to a distant county to trial."

However,

Jensen contends it is in the interest of justice to force Moab
Building Center to travel to a distant county to trial.

Jensen

appears to adopt a double-standard.
In point 4, Jensen also argues that the convenience of
witnesses requires a change of venue.

Jensen alleges "witnesses

are all residing in Box Elder or Salt Lake County and forcing
them to travel to Grand County would create a hardship on them".
This may or may not be true for the witnesses Jensen intends to
use at the trial but is a false statement for the witnesses which
Moab Building Center may decide to use.

In fact, most, if not

all, of the witnesses which Moab Building Center may use at trial
live in Grand or San Juan County.
Jensen wants this court to adopt his view of what is in
the interest of justice and convenience for him, without regards
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to the injustice or inconvenience it would cause to Moab Building
Center,

Moab Building Center did not go to Box Elder County

seeking to do business with Jensen.

Jensen came to Grand County

and asked Moab Building Center to deliver material to San Juan
County.
V.

JENSEN CITES AUTHORITY WHICH DOES NOT SUPPORT
HIS PROPOSITIONS AND ARGUES IRRELEVANT MATERIAL.
In point 2 and point 3 of the argument in Jensen's

brief, Jensen cites Palfreyman v. Trueman, 142 P.2d 677 (Utah
1943) for the proposition that "contracts are required to be in
writing".

Palfreyman in no way supports or eludes to this idea.

To accept such an idea would make moot a whole body of contract
law dealing with oral agreements.

Palfreyman interprets the

predecessor to U.C.A. § 78-13-4.9
In point 3 of the argument in Jensen's brief, Jensen
cites Palfreyman. for the proposition that a motion for change of
venue to defendant's place of residence must be granted if no
objection is raised.

In Palfreyman the court found the facts

justified the venue change because the original claim was filed
in a county of improper venue and a motion was made to change to
a county of proper venue.

There was no discussion on the impact

of the lack of an objection.

There is no requirement in the law

that if no objection to a motion is made, the court is required

9

See discussion under Argument I.B.
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to grant the motion,

A court can only grant a proper motion and

cannot grant an improper motion even if no objection is made.
For example, it makes sense for a court to grant a motion for
change of venue from a court of improper venue to a court of
proper venue.

It does not make sense to require a court to grant

a motion for change of venue from a court of proper venue to a
court of improper venue or even to another court of proper venue
unless the extraordinary circumstances of Section 78-13-9(2)(3)
or (4) are met.

Jensen has tried to argue but has not shown

these extraordinary circumstances exist in this case.
In point 5 Jensen states "Denying the motion prior to
the period for objections has run, is arbitrary.

Jensen makes

this conclusion without citing any authority or explaining to the
court why the action is arbitrary.

Jensen wants the court to

adopt his conclusions without providing the court with any
authority or reasoning.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Seventh
Judicial District Court of Grand County should be affirmed.
Alternatively, if venue is to change at all, it should be changed
to San Juan County where the materials were delivered, and where
Jensen's alleged injury occurred.
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DATED the 1st day of July,

L. Robert Anderson
Daniel G. Anderson
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Respondent
P. 0. Box 275
Monticello, Utah 84535
Telephone (801) 587-2222
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 1st day of July, 1993, I
mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent by firstclass mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Richard M. Jensen
115 North 500 West
Brigham City, Utah 843

Daniel G. Anderson
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ADDENDUM A
78-6-1. CREATION -- JURISDICTION — BIANNUAL REVIEW -COUNSEL NOT NECESSARY — DEFERRING MULTIPLE CLAIMS OF
ONE PLAINTIFF — SUPREME COURT TO GOVERN PROCEDURES.

(1)

The circuit court shall andf if certified by the

Judicial Council, the justice court may create a department known
as the "Small Claims Department" which has jurisdiction in cases:
(a)

for the recovery of money where the amount

claimed does not exceed $2,000 including attorney fees but
exclusive of court costs and interest and where the
defendant resides or the action of indebtedness was incurred
within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is
to be maintained; or
(b)

involving interpleader under Rule 22 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in which the amount claimed
does not exceed $2,000 including attorney fees but exclusive
Of court costs and interest.
(2)

In no event shall the judgment of the small claims

division exceed $2,000 including attorney fees but exclusive of
court costs and interest.
(3)

Counter claims may be maintained in the small

claims division if the counter claim arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim.

A counter claim may not be raised for the

first time in the trial de novo of the small claims action.
(4)

The Judicial Council shall present to the

Judiciary Interim Committee prior to the general session of the
Legislature during odd-numbered years a report and
recommendations concerning the jurisdiction of the small claims
A-l

department.
(5)

Persons or corporations may litigate actions on

behalf of themselves in person or through authorized employees
with or without counsel*
(6)

If a person or corporation other than a

municipality or a political subdivision of the state files
multiple small claims in any one court, the clerk or judge of the
court may remove all but the initial claim from the court•s
calendar in order to dispose of all other small claims matters.
Claims so removed shall be rescheduled as permitted by the
court's calendar•
(7)

Small claims shall be managed in accordance with

simplified rules of procedure and evidence promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
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ADDENDUM B
78-13-1.

ACTIONS RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY.

Actions for the following causes must be tried in the
county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof,
is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the
place of trial as provided in this code:
(1)

For the recovery of real property, or of an

estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any
form of such right or interest, and for injuries to real
property,
(2)

For the partition of real property.

(3)

For the foreclosure of all liens and

mortgages on real property.
Where the real property is situated partly in one
county and partly in another, the plaintiff may select either of
the counties, and the county so selected is the proper county for
the trial of such action.
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ADDENDUM C
78-13-4.

ACTIONS ON WRITTEN CONTRACTS.

When the defendant has signed a contract in the state
to perform an obligation, an action on the contract may be
commenced and tried in the following venues:
(1)

If the action is to enforce an interest in

real property securing a consumer's obligation the action
may be brought only in the county where the real property is
located or where the defendant resides.
(2)

An action to enforce an interest other than

under Subsection (1) may be brought in the county where such
obligation is to be performed, the contract was signed, or
in which the defendant resides.
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ADDENDUM D
78-13-7.

ALL OTHER ACTIONS.

In all other cases the action must be tried in the
county in which the cause of action arises, or in the county in
which any defendant resides at the commencement of the action;
provided, that if any such defendant is a corporation, any county
in which such corporation has its principal office or place of
business shall be deemed the county in which such corporation
resides within the meaning of this section.

If none of the

defendants resides in this state, such action may be commenced
and tried in any county which the plaintiff may designate in his
complaint; and if the defendant is about to depart from the
state, such action may be tried in any county where any of the
parties resides or service is had, subject, however, to the power
of the court to change the place of trial as provided by law.
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ADDENDUM E
MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE TO THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT

Richard M. Jensen, Pro Se
115 North 5th West
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone (801) 723-6194

fm

* > ' 4 092
couflr
°*PUty

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
GRAND COUNTY
115 WEST 200 SOUTH, MOAB, UTAH, 84532
MOAB BUILDING CENTER, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

T
MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE TO
THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff,
vs.

civil

HO.VJ*?-?/

R.M. JENSEN,
Defendant.

COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, Richard M. Jensen, moves the Seventh
District Court
mentioned

to change

action

the place of

the trial

to the First District Court

for

the above

for the following

reasons:
1.

That Defendant resides in Brigham City, Box Elder County,

State of Utah.
2.

That Box Elder County is within the jurisdiction of the

First District Court.
3.

That the contract arose within the jurisdiction of the

First District Court.

DATED this 31st day of August, 1992

Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby

certify

that

on

this

31st

day

of

August,

1992, I

personally deposited with the United States Postal Service, First
Class Mail, Postage Paid, a true and correct copy of the above to
the

following;

RICHARD C.
2471 South
Moab, Utah
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ADDENDUM F
MOTION TO TRANSMIT TO DISTRICT COURT

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County

Richard M. Jensen, Pro Se
115 North 5th West
Brigham City, Utah
84302
Telephone (801) 723-6194

m

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
GRAND COUNTY
BY
115 WEST 200 SOUTH, MOAB, UTAH,
84 532
SMALL CLAIMS COURT

SEP / y 1992
CL2HK OF THE COURT
^ ^

MOAB BUILDING CENTER, INC. ,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

1
)

MOTION TO TRANSMIT TO
DISTRICT COURT

i

Case No. 9287-59

vs.
R.M. JENSEN,
Defendant.

COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, Richard M. Jensen, pursuant to Rule
13 (k) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, moves the Small Claims
Court to transmit to the District Court the above mentioned
for the following
1.

That

counterclaim
2.

reasons:

Defendant

and

Counterclaim

Plaintiff

has

filed

a

in the amount of $11,275.00.

That

Counterclaim

action

the

amount

Plaintiff

is

prayed

for

by

in excess

of

the

amount allowed by the Utah Code, Annotated
court.
DATED this 31st day of August, 1992

F-l

the

Defendant

jurisdiction

of

and
the

1953, for small claims

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify

that on this 31st day of August, 1992, I

personally deposited with the United States Postal Service, First
Class Mail, Postage Paid, a true and correct copy of the above to
the following:

RICHARD C. HOVER, SEC.
2471 South Highway 191
Moab, Utah 84532
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